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Comments and Casenotes
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMANDS FOR OPEN SPACES
IN MARYLAND SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
By JOHN BRENTNALL POWELL, JR.
INTRODUCTION
In assessing the causes of the slum and blighted areas which exist
in the United States, it seems clear that a characteristic of the typical
slum is its inadequate park and playground space. Experience has
shown that once subdivision and development have taken place, it is
virtually impossible for the city to provide the needed open space with-
out either demolishing buildings or completely redeveloping an area.1
In an effort to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, there has been
a considerable increase in the demands placed on subdividers 2 to pro-
vide an adequate amount of public open space in new subdivisions.3
The purpose of this discussion is not to suggest new demands to
be placed on the subdivider but rather to examine the efficacy of the
existing requirements for land for parks, schools, and playgrounds.
By comparing the current requirements in Maryland with existing
authority on the subject,' the municipalities of the State can be guided
in their effort to create subdivision regulations which will be upheld by
the courts, and which, absent any judicial challenge, will not place
unconstitutional burdens on the subdivider.
The practical problems faced by "city planners" in Maryland are
(1) what administrative steps must be taken in order to exercise
legally the authority allowing them to require adequate open spaces in
new subdivisions, and (2) having taken the steps required by statute
and regulation, what restraints may be imposed by the courts when a
1. Planning Advisory Service, Public Open Space in Subdivisions, Information
Report No. 46, p. 1 (Jan. 1953).
2. The term "subdivider" really has no meaning today inasmuch as the various
processes involved in converting unimproved land into a residential community is done
by more than one person. The regulations dealing with park land and school sites are
really imposed upon the developer. The term "subdivider" will be used in this dis-
cussion, nevertheless, to represent the person or persons who are affected by subdivision
regulations dealing with open space. The only exception will be when a different word
is specifically used in a regulation.
3. Information on the practice of governmental bodies with respect to require-
ments made on subdividers for public open space in new developments was first com-
piled in the work by LAUTNER, SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LAND
SUBDIVISION PRACTICES (1941). An effort to up-date this study was made in Planning
Advisory Service, Public Open Space in Subdivisions, Information Report No. 46
(Jan. 1953) and Planning Advisory Service, Public Open Space in Subdivisions,
Information Report No. 46 (Supp. Feb. 1953). See also Note, Platting, Planning and
Protection - A Summary of Subdivision Statutes, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205 (1961).
4. There are no reported Maryland cases which have challenge the open space
requirements found in the subdivision regulations of the various municipalities.
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planning commission places on the subdivider heavy demands for
open spaces?
ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS REQUIRED
OF THE MUNICIPALITY
Maryland's enabling statute5 authorizes the incorporated political
subdivisions of the state (referred to as municipalities') to regulate,
among other things, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces.7
To carry out this task, any municipality is empowered to regulate and
restrict the use of land." Such regulations shall be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan and shall be designed to promote health and
general welfare and to facilitate the adequate provision of schools,
parks and other public requirements.9 Any municipality is authorized
to create a planning commission and to carry out a municipal plan."0
The planning commission will have the duty to make a master plan
for the physical development, character and extent of the municipality
including the general location of playgrounds, squares, public buildings,
parks and other public grounds and open spaces." After the master
plan is adopted and duly filed, all new subdivision plats must be sub-
mitted for approval to the commission, and no subdivision plat is
allowed to be filed or recorded until it has been approved by the
commission.' 2 Before exercising the authority to pass on subdivision
plats, the planning commission must prepare regulations governing
the subdivision of land within its jurisdiction. 13 Such regulations may
provide for adequate and convenient open spaces for recreation.' 4 In
Anne Arundel County, the commission may accept a cash payment from
the developer in lieu of the actual establishment of land areas by the
developer for recreational purposes, and such payments are to be held
in escrow and used by that county's legislative body for the purpose of
acquiring parks and playgrounds and shall be used for this purpose and
no other." Based on the authority granted in the enabling act, fifteen
counties have created planning agencies which have in turn enacted
subdivision regulations. 16
The most obvious problem is the fact that not all municipalities
of the state have complied with the enabling act. Since the enabling
5. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 1 (1957). The term "enabling act" has traditionally
been used with reference to zoning powers, but the term will be used in this discussion
to refer to subdivision control.
6. See definition of "municipality" in MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 10 (Supp. 1964).
7. Rather than an enabling statute, the device used in some states to regulate
subdivisions is a statute which requires that all plats be approved by some agency of
the state. See Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389,
400 (1953).
8. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 2 (1957).
9. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 3 (1957).
10. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 11 (1957).
11. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 15 (1957).
12. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 25 (1957).
13. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 26 (Supp. 1964).
14. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 26 (Supp. 1964).
15. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 26A (Supp. 1964).
16. DIRECTORY Or OFFICIAL LOCAL PLANNING AGENCIES IN MARYLAND (Jan. 1965).
The counties with regulations are: Allegany, Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Cecil,
Harford, Howard, Kent, Montgomery, Prince George's, Queen Anne's, St. Mary's,
Talbot, Washington, and Wicomico.
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act provides that the authority to pass upon subdivision plats can only
rest with local planning commissions created by the municipality, the
local legislature is precluded from exercising the authority which it has
not delegated to the planning commission." One reason for such strict-
ness is that before a planning commission can refuse approval of a
plat it must adopt a master plan and subdivision regulations and before
such regulations can be adopted, there must be a public hearing.'" This
procedure affords the developer an element of protection which would
be lost if the legislature were able to pass on subdivision plats without
being compelled to follow the procedures required of a planning com-
mission. It has also been held that when the power of approval of
subdivision plats is granted to the municipalities through a planning
commission, failure to create a planning commission is no justification
for refusing to approve a plat which conforms to the state enabling
act. 9 Even when a local planning commission has been created pur-
suant to the enabling act, the failure of that body to set forth a master
plan and regulations will preclude disapproval of the plat."° It is clear
that the permissive type of enabling act in Maryland is designed to
turn over the task of subdivision control to a municipality-established
local planning commission under the standards set out in the enabling
statute. This means that those municipalities which do not have a
planning commission, a master plan, and subdivision regulations have
temporarily forfeited their right to control future subdivisions.
DEMANDS PLACED UPON THE SUBDIVIDER
The remainder of this discussion will consider problems which
may arise when a municipality has created a planning commission
which in turn has developed a master plan and regulations. The focus
will be on an analysis of the lines the Maryland courts might draw in
delineating the legitimate demands which the municipalities can make
as they seek to provide adequate land for parks, playgrounds, and
schools. The analysis of municipal subdivision ordinances will be
limited to the counties surrounding Baltimore City."' This is appro-
priate because of the increased importance of having valid subdivision
regulations in this area due to the reduced amount of remaining open
area and increasing population density. It is also predictable that due
to the great demand for subdivisions in this area, any test of the regu-
17. See Magnolia Dev. Co. v. Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89 A.2d 664 (1952); City of
Rahway v. Raritan Homes, Inc., 21 N.J. Super. 541, 91 A.2d 409 (1952). Contra,
Hilbol Realty, Inc. v. Barnhart, 205 Misc. 187, 126 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1953).
18. MD. COnt ANN. art. 66B, § 26 (Supp. 1964).
19. People ex rel. Jackson & Morris, Inc. v. Smuczynski, 345 Il. App. 63, 102
N.E.2d 168 (1951) ; cf. People ex rel. Tilden v. Massieon, 279 Ill. 312, 116 N.E.
639 (1917).
20. Knutson v. State, 239 Ind. 656, 157 N.E.2d 469 (1959).
21. Due to the lack of undeveloped areas in Baltimore City, there are no require-
ments placed on a subdivider of land within Baltimore City to set aside open space for
parks, schools, or playgrounds. Baltimore Regional Planning Council, Zoning and
Subdivision Laws in the Baltimore Region, Technical Report No. 8 (Jan. 1963).
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lations will arise in this area of the state. The regulations of Anne
Arundel County,22 Baltimore County,23 Harford County,24 and Howard
22. The Anne Arundel County Subdivision Regulations state in part as follows:
"Where a proposed pr.rk, playground or other recreational area, proposed
school site, or other public ground, shown in the adopted park plan, school plan
or other adopted part of the master plan of the county, is located in whole or
in part within the proposed subdivision, such proposed public ground or park, if
not dedicated to public use, or conveyed to the board of county commissioners, or
the board of education, shall be reserved for a period of not less than six months
from the date of final approval of the final plat by the planning and zoning com-
mission, for acquisition by the county commissioners, board of education or other
public agency by purchase or other means." ANNE ARUND4L COUNTY CODE,
§ 32-22 (1957).
"Where held appropriate by the planning and zoning commission, open spaces
suitably located and of adequate size for parks, playgrounds or other recreational
purposes for local or neighborhood use shall be provided for in the design of the
proposed subdivision; and, if not dedicated to the public or conveyed to the board
of county commissioners, shall be reserved for the common use of all property
owners in the proposed subdivision by covenant in the deeds. This shall normally
be considered to be about five per cent of the gross area of the subdivision.
Streams, lakes and other watercourse areas may be considered as part of the
five per cent." ANNE ARUNDXL COUNTY CODE, § 32-23 (1957).
The state statute cites Anne Arundel County as the only municipality which has the
right to accept a cash payment from the developer in lieu of the actual establishment
of land areas for recreation purposes. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 26A (Supp. 1964).
23. The Baltimore County Subdivision Regulations state in part as follows:
"No preliminary plan for the proposed development of land for residential
purposes in Baltimore County shall be approved by the planning board unless
such plan provides for local open space tracts. . . .
Local open space tracts, at the option of the developer, may be retained
permanently by him, or deeded by him to the county. When such tracts are
retained by the developer, plans for improvement and maintenance of these tracts
must be approved by the board of recreation and parks, and suitable deed cove-
nants made to assure both continuing use of the tracts for local open space pur-
poses and proper operation and maintenance of the same to said board's satisfaction.
As an alternative, the developer, at his option, may deed a local open space
tract to the county.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to modify or limit the provisions
of Sec. 23.17 of the 1962 Cumulative Supplement to the Baltimore County Code,
1958 .. " BALTO. COUNTY CODE, § 44-2 (1958), as amended, Bill No. 68, Legis-
lative Session 1963, Legislative Day No. 11 (to take effect Sept. 26, 1963).
The Baltimore County Planning Commission drafted new Subdivision Regulations
on Feb. 26, 1965, which should become effective in the near future. The provisions
quoted above remain the same in the proposed draft. Sec. 23.17 of the BALTIMORE
COUNTY CODE (Supp. 1962), provides that if a proposed subdivision plan conflicts
with any proposal in the master plan for any school, park, playground or any other
public improvement or facility, the planning commission may reserve any portion
or all of the land involved for no longer than eighteen months from the date of the
original application for approval of the preliminary subdivision plan. If at the end
of the reservation period, the land so reserved is not acquired for public use or if
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted, the reservation will be void.
24. Harford County's subdivision Regulations state in part as follows:
"Due consideration shall be given to the allocation of areas suitably located
and of adequate size for playgrounds, playfields, schools or parks, for local or
neighborhood use. Such areas may be offered to the Board of County Commis-
sions or other Public Agency, or reserved for common use of all the property
owners within the proposed subdivision, by deed covenants, or may be reserved
for acquisition at the option of the County Commissioners, within a period of one
hundred twenty (120) days, by purchase or other means. The Master Plan of
Harford County shall also be consulted to determine whether any proposed public
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County,25 will be considered to determine exactly what requirements
currently might be placed on the subdivider and what is the legal
foundation on which the regulations rest. The regulations include such
demands as "dedicate," "offer for conveyance," "reserve for acquisition
by the municipality," "reserve land for common use by deed covenant,"
and the payment of a fee for future acquisition of parks or playgrounds.
1. Dedicate
The question of the legality of the requirement to dedicate land
might arise in Anne Arundel County or Baltimore County. In the
Anne Arundel Regulations, the word "dedicated" is used as an alter-
native method by which the county may provide for open spaces. 26
The Baltimore County Regulations state that open space tracts may be
deeded to the county.2 7 A consideration of the requirement on the sub-
divider to dedicate land for public open spaces must be divided into
the question of authority and the question of constitutionality.
a. Authority
The first question is whether a municipality in Maryland has the
authority to require dedication of land as a condition precedent to plat
grounds are shown within the Subdivision, and in this event the land shall be
reserved for one hundred twenty (120) days for acquisition by the County Com-
missioners by purchase or other means.
In determining such areas for conveyance or reservation, however, the Com-
mission shall take into consideration the prospective character of the develop-
ment - whether dense residential, open residential, business or industrial. The
Commission shall waive the provisions for open spaces or public sites where they
would cause undue hardship or where there exists adequate open space to serve
the population in the area platted. Due regard shall be shown for preserving
outstanding natural scenic areas and historic sites or structures. No land shall be
taken under this section by the County or any Public Agency without the payment
of just compensation." Subdivision Regulations: Harford County, Maryland,
§ IV: 4.26 (adopted March 10, 1959 and revised Aug. 1, 1961).
25. Howard County Subdivision Regulations state in part as follows:
"Due consideration shall be given to the allocation of areas suitably located
and of adequate size for playgrounds, playfields, schools and parks for local or
neighborhood use, to be offered for conveyance to the Board of County Commis-
sioners or reserved for common use of all property owners within the proposed
subdivision by deed covenants, or reserved for acquisition at the option of the
County Commissioners within a period of five years by purchase or other means.
In determining such areas for conveyance or reservation, however, the Com-
mission shall take into consideration the prospective character of the develop-
ment - whether dense residential, open residential, business, or industrial. The
Commission may reduce or waive the provision of open spaces and sites in situa-
tions where they would cause undue hardship or where there exists adequate open
space to serve the population in the area to be platted. Where a subdivided area
is too small to provide an open space of suitable size and character, the Com-
mission may specify provision of such a tract as may be combined with open
spaces provided or to be provided in adjoining area, so as to produce a total area
of adequate size. Due regard shall be shown for preserving outstanding natural
or cultural features such as scenic spots or water-courses, exceptionally fine
groves of trees, and historic sites or structures. Provision for public ownership
is usually the best means of assuring their preservation." Howard County
Planning Commission, Howard County Subdivision Regulations, Howard County,
Maryland, p. 12 (March 7, 1961).
26. See regulations cited note 22 supra.
27. See regulations cited note 23 supra.
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approval. The Maryland statute neither expressly authorizes nor for-
bids a municipality to require park land dedication.28
A similar question arose in a Puerto Rican case, Pizarro v.
Planning Board,29 which involved an enabling statute that gave the
local planning board authority to adopt regulations for "obligatory
reservation" of park area as a condition to plat approval. The court
held that the local regulation requiring that park land be "reserved
and dedicated" was not authorized by the statute, nor did the statute
authorize a regulation requiring a transfer of land to the municipality
without compensation to the subdivider, but only authorized a regula-
tion requiring that land in the platted area be reserved for parks.
The opposite conclusion was reached in a New York case, In re
Lake Secor Development Co." The relevant language in the enabling
statute required that before approval by the planning board, a plat
would, in appropriate cases, need to ". . . show a park or parks suitably
located for playgrounds or other recreation purposes."'" The enabling
act also said that in approving such plats, the planning board "...
shall require . . . that the parks shall be of reasonable size for neigh-
borhood playgrounds or other recreation uses." 2 The court held that
a planning board may refuse to approve a plat upon which a subdivider
failed to dedicate to public use sufficient land for parks even though the
word "dedicate" was not found in the statute. The court looked at the
purpose of the statute and other statutes pertaining to the planning
board and determined that, construed together, the board was author-
ized to determine the area on the plat to be used for parks, and to
require its dedication by the subdivider.
If a local planning commission in Maryland were to require a
subdivider to dedicate park land as a condition to plat approval, it is
predictable that the Maryland courts would declare such a demand
outside the authority granted to the county by the enabling act which
only states that the subdivision regulations ". . may provide . . . for
adequate and convenient open spaces for . . . recreation. . . . 33 It
should be noted also that pursuant to Art. 66B, Sec. 19, the planning
commission of a municipality has the power to purchase or condemn
land for parks, grounds, or spaces. It can be argued that to list these
alternatives is to exclude the right to demand dedication to the public.
By taking this approach, the court would avoid the question of the
constitutionality of a demand for the dedication of land to the munici-
pality without compensation as a condition precedent to plat approval.3 4
28. MD. COD ANN. art. 66B (1957).
29. 69 P.R.R. 27 (1948).
30. 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
31. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 149-n, as amended, N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (Supp. 1964),
cited in In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809, 811 (Sup.
Ct. 1931).
32. Ibid.
33. MD. CODS ANN. art. 66B, § 26 (Supp. 1964). [Emphasis added.]
34. In most of the cases which have faced ordinances which require land dedica-
tions or the payment of fees for school and park purposes, the courts have avoided
the constitutional question by finding that the exactions are not authorized by the
applicable enabling act. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing
Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1134 (1964).
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b. Constitutionality
Assuming that Maryland's enabling act would be construed in such
a way as to authorize municipalities to require dedication of land for
public open space, the courts would then be faced with the constitu-
tional issue of whether the required dedication amounts to a taking of
private property for public use without just compensation . 5
In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,6
the Illinois court adopted the following rule:
If the requirement [of dedication] is within the statutory
grant of power to the municipality and if the burden cast upon
the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his
activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden
and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention
of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regula-
tion under the police power.3 7
The planning commission of Mount Prospect did not sustain the heavy
burden of proving that the requirement of dedication of land for
educational and recreational facilities which it sought to impose on
the subdivider was specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity.
The record merely contained an agreed statement of facts which showed
that the then existing school facilities of Mount Prospect were near
capacity. The court concluded that the situation was the result of the
total development of the community and that if the whole community
had not developed to such an extent or if the existing school facilities
were greater, the purported need supposedly would not be present.
The court did not state what it might have held had there been suffi-
cient proof to the effect that the need for recreational and educational
facilities was one that was specifically and uniquely attributable to the
proposed subdivision.
The recent Montana case of Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellow-
stone County3" met the constitutional question head on. Under the facts
of the case, the court concluded that the requirement that a subdivider
dedicate a portion of his land for parks and playgrounds as a condition
precedent to approval of the plat is not an unreasonable exercise of
the police power. The court went on to assert the same rule that
was applied in Pioneer and drew the implication from the Pioneer
opinion that if the record in that case had shown that the need for
additional recreational and educational facilities was created by the
subdivision, then the requirements for land dedication would not have
been considered an unreasonable burden. The Montana statute states
that when the area to be subdivided is over twenty acres, at least one-
ninth of the platted area must be dedicated unless the municipality, for
good cause shown, reduces the amount to one-twelfth."9 On the strength
35. MD. CONST. art. I, § 40, states that the General Assembly shall enact no law
authorizing private property to be taken for public use without just compensation.
36. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) ; 50 ILL. B.J. 626 (1962).
37. Id. at 802.
38. 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964).
39. MONT. RIv. CODe § 11-602 (1947).
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of that statute, the court concluded that the question of whether a
subdivision of twenty acres specifically and uniquely created the need
for a park had been answered by the state legislature. Based on this
analysis, the court concluded that the legislature determined that the
need for a park was not merely concomitant to the natural growth of
the municipality. The court stated that such a determination is within
the province of the Legislature and will not be disturbed unless there
is a preponderance of evidence against it. The Billings case, therefore,
shifted the burden of proof to the subdivider who must prove that his
subdivision is not specifically and uniquely responsible for the need
for land for parks and playgrounds. The burden is made the more
difficult due to the presumptive validity of legislation.
In attempting to predict what type of statutory language would
be required in Maryland to get the result in Billings, it is important to
note the emphasis the court placed on the wording of the statute. The
court stated that the statute is a legislative determination that sub-
divisions of twenty acres or more needed a park or parks. If such a
decision is left to the municipalities, as is the present situation in
Maryland, a different result is indicated.
If the Legislature had felt that such parks were needed merely
because of the growth of the municipality, it would not have made
the requirement that land be dedicated for parks in subdivisions
of this size absolute, but would have made the requirement similar
to the one for subdivisions under ten acres, that is, leaving it
to the discretion of one of the boards mentioned in the statute. °
On the strength of this authority, it would seem that the Anne
Arundel and Baltimore County regulations which call for dedication
and the deeding of land, respectively, are invalid. In order for the
municipalities of Maryland to be able to make such requirements for
land for park or playground purposes, Billings suggests a basic change
in the present statutory scheme. The state enabling act would have
to contain language to the effect that subdivisions of a certain size do
in fact create the need for parks and playgrounds and the state statute
would have to require that there must be dedication of a certain amount
of land to satisfy the need. Once the basic policy is determined by
the legislature, then it would seem that the local planning commission
could only exercise its discretion by reducing the requirements within
established standards. To allow the planning commission complete
freedom to enforce the statute or to excuse the subdivider from the
requirement to dedicate land would seem to be an invalid delegation
of legislative power. It is clear that such a statutory scheme would
divest the local planning commissions of the discretion they now exer-
cise by requiring dedication of land in specified instances regardless of
the particular needs of the subdivision.
The Billings case considered only the requirement of dedication
of land for park and playground use. It did not have to decide whether
the state's police power is broad enough to encompass a requirement
for the dedication of land for schools. This is still an open question.
40. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (Mont.
1964).
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It has been argued that any exaction must fulfill two require-
ments: (1) the improvement financed by the subdivider must inure
directly to the homeowners in the subdivision itself, and to the extent
that they benefit outsiders, compensation must be paid; 4' and (2) the
improvement must be one for which the municipality could ordinarily
levy special assessments. 42 Such an analysis would lead to a distinc-
tion between streets, sewers, and neighborhood parks on the one hand
and school buildings, police and fire stations on the other.4 3 The former
are seen to be valid and the latter unconstitutional.
A more liberal approach4 4 would stress the fact that the consti-
tutional test of legislation is not whether the courts approve the
wisdom of a policy but rather whether it is a reasonable exercise of
the state's police power. It can be argued that it is far from arbitrary
and unreasonable for a legislature to subject new residents to increased
municipal costs attributable to their presence by the technique of
imposing costly requirements on the subdivider. The reasonableness
of such a policy is seen in the fact that it seeks to protect older resi-
dents from tax increases and provides another source of municipal
revenue. It is also questioned whether there is really a constitutional
dividing line between statutes which permit one kind of cost to be
imposed (for instance, street improvements) and not another (for
instance, educational facilities) as long as a method exists for relating
the costs which are sought to be passed on and the actual demands
made on the subdivider. 5
Of the municipalities being considered, Harford and Howard
counties may require the subdivider to furnish land for school sites.
Even if a requirement for land for school purposes were held to be
constitutional, the municipality would have to weigh the desire to save
itself certain expenses against various other policy considerations.
The cost of such land would, of course, be passed on to the prospective
residents of the subdivision. If the cost of the new homes is dispro-
portionately high, the lots will not be sold. This could result in a loss
of income taxes from an insolvent subdivider as well as the loss of
future property taxes. There is also the argument that when the
government forces up the cost of homes in certain areas, it is indirectly
making the subdivision less accessible to minority groups with only
41. See Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRAcusE L. Rzv.
405, 407-09 (1963) ; Schmandt, Municipal Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAM
L. Rev. 637, 650 (1961) ; Comment, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 310, 320-23 (1961).
42. Reps & Smith, supra note 41, at 409-10.
43. See 14 MCQUILLUN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.11 (3d ed. 1950).
44. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALS
L.J. 1119 (1964).
45. This theory seems to have no support in case law. See Township of Springfield
v. Bensley, 19 N.J. Super. 147, 158, 88 A.2d 271 (Ch. 1952), which held that a
municipality has no right to refuse to grant approval for a building project merely
because its school system would be unable to absorb the increase of students or would
increase taxes. See also Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison Township, 68 N.J.
Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Law Div. 1961), where the court said by dictum
that any attempt to compel a developer to pay for building a school, or to donate land
for a school, as a condition precedent to giving approval to a subdivision violates the
subdivider's constitutional rights.
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moderate income who might otherwise be able to afford the homes
were the cost based solely on demand and the quality of the product.
The result would be to preclude certain people from living where they
otherwise might if certain costs were absorbed by all the residents of
the municipality.4
2. Offer for Conveyance
a. Parks and Playgrounds
A technique being used by three of the municipalities to insure
the preservation of open space requires that open space may be offeredfor conveyance to the county. This could mean either that land is to
be offered for sale or that the municipality will take under the power
of eminent domain. If the subdivider is able to bargain freely for a rea-
sonable price, under the first possibility, there would not be any problem.
Failing to agree on a price, it would seem that the municipality
could take by eminent domain under this provision. The traditional
problems encountered when trying to exercise the power of eminent
domain are: the taking must be for a public purpose, there must be a
necessity, and there must be just compensation made to the owner of
the property taken.47 Maryland has specifically provided that the
acquisition of interest in real property for the preservation of open
spaces and areas constitutes a public purpose for which public funds
may be expended or advanced.4" Any county or city may acquire the
fee or any lesser interest to achieve this end.49 "Open space" or "open
area" is defined in the statute as "any space or area characterized
by (1) great natural scenic beauty or (2) whose existing openness,
natural condition, or present state of use, if retained, would enhance
the present or potential value of abutting or surrounding urban develop-
ment, or would maintain or enhance the conservation of natural or
scenic resources." 5 The question of whether a public purpose is in
fact being served is for judicial determination; yet there is good reason
to believe that preservation of open space is for a public purpose.5 This
is especially true in Maryland on the strength of the above statute. 52
46. The force of these arguments is played down in Heyman & Gilhool, supra
note 44, at 1155-57, where the emphasis is on methods of relieving the financial pres-
sures on municipalities and not on the dangers of governmental racial discrimination
resulting from governmentally-compelled increased costs for housing. The authors
state at page 1155:
"Subdivision housing is by its nature exclusionary. Many communities are
made up primarily of houses in price ranges in excess of the financial capabilities
of a large proportion of the population. Income level exclusion (and to a large
extent concomitant racial exclusion) has already occurred, and modest additional
price increments are inconsequential."
These observations fail to distinguish the vital difference between high costs prompted
by the elements of a competitive market and high costs generated by governmental
requirements.
47. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
48. MD. CoDe ANN. art. 66C, § 357A(a) (Supp. 1964).
49. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 66C, § 357A(a) (Supp. 1964).
50. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, § 357A(b) (Supp. 1964).
51. See Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288,
23 N.E.2d 665 (1939). See also Note, 75 HARv. L. Rxv. 1622, 1631-35 (1962).
52. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, § 357A(a) (Supp. 1964).
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b. Future School Sites
It should be noted that schools do not seem to be included in the
definition of "open spaces" or "open areas" in the Maryland statute,
53
inasmuch as the condemnation is not being made with the purpose of
retaining the existing openness, natural condition, or present state of
use. Instead, the condemnation is being made to provide ground for
the construction of a school.
Another problem may arise if the taking by eminent domain is for
future school sites. In Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids
v. Baczewski,54 a taking was invalidated when there was no present
intention of building a school. In that case, the court had to interpret
the Michigan constitutional provision that there must be a necessity
for using such property.55 The court stated that there must be proof
that the property will either be immediately used for the purpose for
which it is sought to be condemned or within a period that the jury
determines to be the near future or a reasonably immediate use.56 The
court had little trouble deciding that where the property to be con-
demned would not actually be used for a school site for thirty years
and the purpose of acquiring the land now was in order to save money
in the future, the requirement of necessity was not met.
While a delay of thirty years would not satisfy the criterion of
necessity, the right to condemn for future highway construction has
been upheld.5 7 The Maryland court will not review a decision that it
is necessary to acquire property in order to build a road unless there
is a showing that the decision is oppressive, arbitrary, or unreason-
able.5" It may be that an important factor in such judicial review is
whether there is a reasonably definite plan for future construction.59
It would seem reasonable to assume that the same standards as to
necessity that are applied in highway condemnation cases will be used
in judging the necessity of condemning land for future school sites.
This would indicate that the Maryland courts will be sympathetic with
a decision that it is necessary to condemn land for a future school site
when there is a reasonably definite plan for future construction and
there is no showing of bad faith.
53. MD. CoDe ANN. art. 66C, § 357A(b) (Supp. 1964).
54. 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954) ; 18 U. Ds'T. L.J. 333 (1955).
55. MICH. CONST. art. 13, § 2 (1908). This provision has been omitted from the
Michigan Constitution of 1963; yet it would seem that the requirement of necessity
is still applicable.
56. Accord, Kern County Union High School District v. McDonald, 180 Cal. 7,
179 Pac. 180 (1919) ; City of New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675
(1930) ; and State ex rel. City of Duluth v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 179 Minn. 548,
229 N.W. 883 (1930).
57. See Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036 (1912) ; Pittsburgh
Junction R. Co.'s Appeal, 122 Pa. 511, 6 At. 564 (1886); Vermont Hydro-Electric
Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 Atl. 223 (1921).
58. State Roads Comm'n v. Franklin, 201 Md. 549, 95 A.2d 99 (1953). Taking
for future use was also approved in State Road Dep't v. Southland, Inc., 177 So. 2d
512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Woodlawn v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n,
220 Ark. 731, 249 S.W.2d 564 (1952) ; but was disapproved in State ex rel. Sharp v.
0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955).
59. See generally, Helstad, Recent Trends in Highway Condemnation Law, 1964
WASH. U.L.Q. 58, 61 (1964).
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3. Reservation of Land
With the exception of Anne Arundel County, there are provisions
which call for the subdivider to reserve certain lands for acquisition
within a specified length of time. Howard County specifies that the
municipality must exercise its option to acquire the land within five
years. Baltimore County allows 18 months, and Harford County
allows itself only 120 days. The inevitable question is how long can a
subdivider be compelled to hold in reserve land designated for a public
purpose. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that immediate
action to acquire title was not necessary."0 The opposite conclusion
was reached when the Pennsylvania court looked at a state statute
which allows a local government three years to acquire land which
had been planned as a park. The court held the statute unconstitutional
and stated as follows:
The injustice to property owners of permitting a municipal
body to tie up an owner's property for three years must be appar-
ent to everyone. The city can change its mind or abandon or
refuse to take the property at the end of three years; but in the
meantime the owner has been, to all intents and purposes, deprived
of his property and its use and the land is practically unsalable.
The action of the City of Beaver Falls in plotting this ground
for a park or playground and freezing it for three years is, in
reality, a taking of property by possibility, contingency, blockade
and subterfuge, in violation of the clear mandate of our Constitu-
tion that property cannot be taken or injured or applied to public
use without just compensation having been first made and secured.6 '
It would seem that a required reservation of park land in new sub-
divisions for an indefinite period is of doubtful validity; yet a require-
ment to reserve such land for a specified and relatively brief period of
time might be sustained.6 More specifically, it would seem that five
years is an unreasonable amount of time to give the municipality to
exercise its option to acquire land in a subdivision. A reasonable length
of time should reflect the reasonable time required for a municipality
to decide to acquire land, to raise the money, and to complete the trans-
action. The 120 days allowed in Harford County is more than rea-
sonable inasmuch as the delay of a municipality in raising money can
be considerable. It would seem that the purpose of reserving land is
to give a municipality time to consider the future needs in a proposed
subdivision and to acquire the land at a far cheaper price than it would
if it waited and would only acquire by eminent domain. A period of
60. Segarra v. Puerto Rico Planning Bd., 71 P.R.R. 139 (1950).
61. Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34, 36-7 (1951).
62. See Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40
CORNLL L.Q. 258, 274 (1955). See also Fry, Subdivision Control and Planning,
U. ILL. L.F. 411, 439 (1961).
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one and one-half years would satisfy these requirements and at the same
time minimize grounds for constitutional attack.6 8
A Maryland statute gives indirect support to this conclusion.64
This state has been one of the leaders in legislating a technique
whereby the municipality can compensate an owner whose land is to
be reserved for a period longer than would seem reasonable.6 " A
municipality may purchase a "development right easement" which
serves to compensate the subdivider for any losses which he sustains
by reason of his inability to develop the land for a given period of
time.6 6 This possibility is an alternative to reserving land for long
periods of time and would seem to emphasize the idea that the time
allowed for reservation relates to the time needed by a municipality to
decide whether to acquire the land and to make the purchase.
4. Reserve Land for Common Use by Deed Covenant
Another requirement found in all of the subdivision regulations
being considered requires a subdivider to reserve land for the common
use of all the property owners within the proposed subdivision by deed
covenants. This requirement would seem to have the same practical
effect as the requirement to dedicate land to the municipality in that
under either scheme the owner has no control over his property.67 The
subdivider is required to turn over a portion of his land to public use
without receiving any direct compensation. This being true, such a
requirement should be judged by the same constitutional standards
that are applied to dedication.
5. Payment of Fees
The only remaining requirement to be considered is the cash
payment in lieu of land. A consideration of this exaction must be
divided into the question of authority to make such a demand, and,
secondly, the constitutionality once the authority is granted.
a. Authority
The statutory authority to demand fees from subdividers to be
held in escrow for the future acquisition of parks and playgrounds is
clearly established in the case of Anne Arundel County.6" Authority
63. See Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivisions, 14 SYRAcusZ L. Rzv.
405, 422-23 (1963).
64. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, § 357A (Supp. 1964).
65. See Note, 75 HARV. L. Rv. 1622, 1635-37 (1962).
66. MD. COD4 ANN. art. 66C § 357A (Supp. 1964).
67. See Reps, supra note 62, at 271. Cf. Pizarro v. Puerto Rico Planning Bd.,
69 P.R.R. 27, 35 (1948), where the court distinguished between the reservation and
the transfer of land.
68. "In Anne Arundel County, the commission may accept a cash payment from
the developer in lieu of the actual establishment of land areas by the developer
for recreational purposes, and such payments shall be held in escrow and used
by the council for the purpose of acquiring parks and playgrounds and shall be
used for this purpose and no other." MD. CODx ANN. art. 66B, § 26A (Supp. 1964).
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for other municipalities to make similar demands in their regulations
seems highly doubtful so long as such authority is not specifically
granted in the enabling statutes.6 9
b. Constitutionality
Granting that statutory authority exists for Anne Arundel County
to demand cash payments in lieu of land, it would seem that the statute
could be attacked on the grounds of inadequate standards. A portion
of the New York Town Law70 which is similar to the Maryland statute
was held invalid for that reason.71 In particular, it was held that the
statute failed to set standards as to the amount of the fees which can
be required or standards determining whether a fee is to be required
at all. The same weaknesses are apparent in the Maryland statute.
Another similarity is the absence of a standard as to use of the cash
contribution, and this is a constitutional question.
If it is assumed that the problems of authorization and adequate
standards can be overcome, such a provision faces the same constitu-
tional obstacles that are asserted against the demand for the dedication
of land.72 The objection is that in both instances the exaction will be
used by the general community rather than for the exclusive benefit
of the subdivider. Although no cases seem to turn on this considera-
tion, there are considerable dicta to the effect that fees can not be
required where the purpose is to help the entire city meet its future
needs for park and school sites and the fund raising method does not
relate to the needs of the particular subdivision.7"
While this high standard of constitutionality is applied both to
the demands for land for park, playground, or school purposes, and to
fees in substitution thereof, the same does not seem to be true where
fees are substituted for requirements which have long received approval
by the courts such as installation of sewerage facilities.74
69. See Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957);
Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) ; Coronado
Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962) ; Haugen v. Gleason,
226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
70. "If the planning board determines that a suitable park or parks of adequate
size cannot be properly located in any such plat or is otherwise not practical,
the board may require as a condition to approval of any such plat a payment to
the town of an amount to be determined by the town board, which amount shall
be available for the use by the town for neighborhood park, playground or recrea-
tional purposes including the acquisition of property." N.Y. TOWN LAW, § 277
(Supp. 1964).
71. Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d
729 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
72. See Taylor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 344, 354 (1962).
73. See Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957);
Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) ; Gulest
Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup.
Ct. 1960) ; Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
74. Cash fees have been held valid when they are designed to offset the total cost
of providing new sewerage facilities for all the prospective subdivisions in the area,
Stanco v. Suozzi, 11 Misc. 2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1958); and when a
fee was for the cost of connecting with and the use of sewers even though the benefit
to the subdivider from the money paid into the fund could not be specifically pointed
out, Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. 900, 183 Cal. App. 2d 533
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Contra, City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 8 Cal. 674, 186 Cal.
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There are two situations wherein Anne Arundel County is specific-
ally authorized to accept a cash payment from the developer or con-
tractor. One instance is where the payment is in lieu of construction
and installation of improvements or utilities, 7 and the other is where
the payment is in lieu of the actual establishment of land areas for
recreational purposes. 76 It would seem that in the first situation, the
provision will be upheld because it is a substitute for exactions which
have long been approved and the questions of direct, exclusive, and
immediate benefit to the subdivision in question will not be relevant.
In the second situation, however, such questions are relevant and seem
to apply both to the requirement of land itself and to the use of the
cash payment which may be substituted for the demand for land.
In view of the foregoing discussion, several suggestions can be
made so as to better insure that the requirement of cash payments in
lieu of land will be upheld. Both the enabling act and the municipality's
regulations should expressly authorize the payment of fees; and both
should set out standards as to the amount which can be demanded,
whether a cash payment is to be required at all, and some specific lan-
guage to the effect that the land will be used for the direct, immediate
and exclusive benefit of the subdivision which is being charged.
SUMMARY
(1) Without creating a planning commission which develops a
master plan and subdivision regulations as provided in MD. CODE ANN.
art. 66B (1957), a municipality has no authority to regulate future sub-
divisions. As of January, 1965, there were eight counties in this position.
(2) The requirement of dedication of land found in the Anne
Arundel and the Baltimore County regulations would probably be
held invalid on the ground that no authority for such an exaction can
be found in the state enabling statute. Such a result would avoid the
constitutional question of whether there has been a taking without
just compensation.
(3) Assuming the requirement of dedication of land is held to be
authorized based on the current enabling act, or assuming an enabling
act specifically allowing the requirement of dedication, the constitu-
tional question will have to be faced. The Anne Arundel requirement
of dedication and the Baltimore County requirement for land to be
deeded to the county are seen to be invalid on constitutional grounds.
(4) The only case which has sustained the requirement of dedica-
tion of land for park and playground use is the Montana case of Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County. In order for the Maryland
law to conform to the provisions found valid in Montana, there would
have to be a specific provision in the enabling act which would divest
the local planning commission of much of the flexibility which it
now enjoys.
App. 2d 61 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), where the court pointed out that the cash payment
required would be used to build a particular drainage ditch which was undoubtedly
for the direct benefit of the subdivision in question when considered in relation to it
and the adjoining area.
75. MD. CODM ANN. art. 66B, § 26 (Supp. 1964).
76. MD. CoD4 ANN. art. 66B, § 26A (Supp. 1964).
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(5) Even if the Maryland statute conformed with the scheme
suggested in Billings, the constitutionality of a requirement for the
dedication of land to be used for school sites would still be open to
doubt. Based on current judicial thinking, such an exaction would
probably be held unconstitutional. But even if the requirement were
considered valid, it is suggested that policy reasons outweigh the
possible economic advantage of passing educational costs along to the
residents of a new subdivision.
(6) The requirement to "offer for conveyance" is clearly valid if
it means a sale following a genuine bargain over price. If it means a
taking by eminent domain, then such a taking as applies to parks and
playgrounds would be for a public purpose and presumably for just
compensation and therefore valid. A taking of land for a future school
site would be of doubtful validity under the present statute.(7) The possible invalidity of eminent domain for future school
sites would seem to be solved if two steps are taken:
(a) MD. CODE ANN. art. 66C, sec. 357A(b) (Supp. 1964)
should be reworded so that it no longer implies that
school sites are excluded from its coverage.
(b) The condemnation of land for future school sites is part
of a reasonably definite plan for future construction.
(8) The reservation of land for possible acquisition by the munici-
pality is a justifiable demand so long as the duration of reservation
is related to the reasonable time required for a municipality to reach
a decision as to whether to buy the land, to raise the money, and to
conclude the transaction. The period of five years required by Howard
County would seem to be unreasonably long. A year and one-half
would have a better chance of being sustained.
(9) The requirement to reserve land for the common use by deed
covenant would seem to face the same constitutional obstacles as the
demand for dedication. This is an area where the planning commis-
sion can effectively point out to the subdivider the fact that adequate
and convenient open space in a subdivision is not a burden upon him,
but, on the contrary, will appreciably raise the value of every lot and
the subdivision as a whole. The argument of self-interest should not
be overlooked by a municipality when it seeks to accomplish by per-
suasion what it might not be able to demand by regulation.
(10) Even when authority exists to demand cash payments, there
must be adequate standards and specific language in both the state
statutes and the regulations to the effect that the land will be used for
the direct, immediate, and exclusive benefit of the subdivision involved.
The present statute is deficient in both these respects. If these sugges-
tions are carried out, such an exaction would face the constitutional
problems which apply to dedication of land. It has been seen that fees
for park and playground use within the subdivision would have a better
chance of being upheld than would fees for school sites.
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CONCLUSIONS
As reflected in the four counties considered, the current state of
Maryland subdivision regulations as they apply to open spaces indi-
cates that the planning commissions have been influenced far more
by the concepts of city planners than by judicial thinking. While
municipalities must conceive of new regulations to meet changing cir-
cumstances, they must, at the same time, conform to proper procedural
requirements and must be content to place on the subdivider only those
requirements which are deemed to be constitutional.
It is a truism that the courts do not look upon the requirements
for land for parks, playgrounds, and schools with the same favor as
when they judge the constitutionality of improvements such as streets,
gutters, sewers, and sidewalks. This is not to say that the courts are
unsympathetic with the problems of subdivision controls. But it is
to say that if there is to be any hope for legitimate control over the
preservation of open spaces in new subdivisions, the demands placed
on the subdivider and passed on to the new residents must conform to
judicial pronouncements. Just because the subdivision regulations en-
forced by the municipalities of Maryland have not been challenged, does
not mean that the statutes and local regulations should not be re-
examined in an attempt to bring them into line with court decisions.
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